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Autonomy, Respect, and 
Arrogance in the Danish 
Cartoon Controversy
Christian F. Rostbøll
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
Autonomy is increasingly rejected as a fundamental principle by liberal 
political theorists because it is regarded as incompatible with respect for 
diversity. This article seeks, via an analysis of the Danish cartoon contro-
versy, to show that the relationship between autonomy and diversity is more 
complex than often posited. Particularly, it asks whether the autonomy 
defense of freedom of expression encourages disrespect for religious feel-
ings. Autonomy leads to disrespect for diversity only when it is understood 
as a character ideal that must be promoted as an end in itself. If it by contrast 
is understood as something we should presume everyone possesses, it pro-
vides a strong basis for equal respect among people from diverse cultures. 
A Kantian conception of autonomy can justify the right to freedom of expres-
sion while it at the same time requires that we in the exercise of freedom of 
expression show respect for others as equals.
Keywords: autonomy; diversity; freedom of expression; liberalism; respect
As a result of the increased awareness of the importance of cultural diversity among political theorists, the principle of autonomy has now 
come under attack. Political liberals such as John Rawls and Charles 
Larmore reject justifying liberal principles on the basis of “comprehensive” 
conceptions of autonomy;1 liberal pluralists such as William galston hold 
that liberalism must not take side for autonomy and reflection against tradi-
tion and faith;2 and libertarian Chandran Kukathas insists that the state has 
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no business in promoting a value such as autonomy, which many people do 
not regard to be part of their conception of the good.3
This article aims, via an analysis of the Danish cartoon controversy, to 
advance the discussion among political theorists about whether liberalism 
can rely on autonomy as a fundamental principle.4 In order to show that the 
relationship between autonomy and respect for diversity is more complex 
than posited in the autonomy/diversity debate, I distinguish two different 
ways “autonomy” may be understood and consider the relationship between 
them. In particular, I am interested in how autonomy is used in justifica-
tions for freedom of expression and whether these uses are incompatible 
with respect for diversity. The objection to autonomy-based liberalism that 
the article responds to in relation to the justification of freedom of expres-
sion issue in general and the Danish cartoon case in particular begins from 
the empirical premise that some minority groups do not place the same 
value on individual autonomy as some liberal theorists do—and as the 
Danish majority allegedly does. I argue that if we understand the autonomy 
that freedom of expression is justified with reference to not as a character 
ideal that has to be promoted (“Millian autonomy”) but as a quality we 
presuppose everyone has (“Kantian autonomy”), then this principle rather 
than creating hierarchies among forms of life provides a strong basis for 
equal respect among people committed to diverse cultures.5 Consequently, 
it would be wrong to blame the “Enlightenment value of autonomy” for the 
lack of respect for Muslims in the Danish cartoon controversy. Furthermore, 
it is not only religious minorities who dislike having their fundamental 
beliefs challenged. Many people feel that it is a violation of their privacy 
when others attempt to make them change their minds.
My argument relies on a specific (and admittedly debatable) interpreta-
tion of the Danish cartoon controversy, specifically of empirical questions 
of relations of power and status. Thus, the conclusions I draw cannot be 
evaluated a priori or conceptually but requires also considerations of 
empirical questions. This, however, is a point of the argument itself: we 
should not see universal principles as directly applicable to a concrete case 
without discussion of how best to interpret both principles and the context 
to which they are applied.6 Moreover, the price for political philosophy of 
not engaging with empirical questions is a political philosophy that “has 
become a practice whose object is itself . . . rather than politics itself.”7
Thus, I begin with an interpretation of the cartoon controversy, focus-
ing on the broader discourse of which the cartoons were part and on the 
political and social context in which they were published. I then go on to 
consider different ways in which autonomy is used to justify freedom of 
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expression. The ensuing analysis of the cartoon controversy shows how 
two different conceptions of autonomy lead, respectively, to arrogance 
toward and respect for (some) religious feelings.8 If freedom of expression 
is justified as a means to promote autonomy as a character ideal, this easily 
(if not necessarily) connects with a use of freedom of expression where 
some are seen as having achieved the ideal while others are seen as having 
failed. But if freedom of expression is justified with reference to autonomy 
as a shared human quality, this will demand of us a different kind of humil-
ity. While I distinguish “Kantian” and “Millian” conceptions of autonomy 
and see the first as supplying the constraint against disrespect, we cannot 
entirely dispense with autonomy as a character ideal. Rather, the promotion 
of the latter kind of autonomy should be limited by the more fundamental 
requirement that we treat others as moral equals.
The Cartoon Controversy, Enlightenment 
Values, and Public Discourse
When the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in September 2005 pub-
lished twelve cartoons under the heading “The Face of Muhammad,” the aim 
was “to push back self-imposed limits on expression” and to teach the small 
Danish Muslim minority that in a secular democracy “one must be prepared 
to put up with scorn, mockery, and ridicule.”9 The cartoons provoked first 
a domestic dispute over freedom of expression and the integration of 
 Mus lim immigrants in Denmark and later an international crisis with dem-
onstrations and embassy burnings in a number of predominantly Muslim 
countries. In 2008 the controversy flared up again after the alleged discov-
ery of a plot to murder one of the cartoonists and the republication of his 
cartoon, the most provocative of the twelve depicting Muhammad with a 
bomb in the turban.
Of the dividing lines in the Danish public debate about the cartoons, the 
one drawn between standing firm on Enlightenment values versus giving in 
to the demand for respect for religious feelings is of particular interest from 
the perspective of political theory. This way of framing the debate was 
widespread among those who defended the publication of the cartoons.10 
On the same day the cartoons were published, the editorial of Jyllands-
Posten criticized the “political correct” fear of offending Muslims who 
have a worldview as in the “dark middle ages . . . a worldview we in the 
western world left during the Enlightenment.”11 The language of standing 
firm versus giving in was most prominently used by Danish Prime Minister 
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Anders Fogh Rasmussen. One of the actions that led to the escalation of the 
crisis was his refusal in October 2005 to meet with a group of diplomats 
from Muslim countries who had complained about the negative portrayal 
of Islam in the Danish public sphere.12 Rasmussen told the press, “This is a 
matter of principle. I won’t meet with them because it is so crystal clear 
what principles Danish democracy is built upon that there is no reason to 
do so.”13 Looking back at the crisis a year later Rasmussen explained, “The 
Enlightenment . . . has been the driving force behind European develop-
ment and decisive for why we have come as far, as we have. Therefore we 
have something here [i.e. freedom of expression], with regard to which we 
cannot give one millimeter.”14 Another top politician wrote during the crisis 
that it is paramount that “the values of the Enlightenment take hold of more 
Muslims,” which according to her view means that religion “is superseded as 
the central force that human beings submit to.”15 Jyllands-Posten and its def-
enders portrayed the conflict as a question of enlightened Danes versus 
unenlightened Muslims. Specifically, Muslims were seen as insufficiently 
enlightened because they take their religion too seriously and fail to under-
stand that “satire and caricatures of religious and political authorities are not 
expressions of disrespect for or ridicule of groups because of their faith or 
beliefs.”16 The underlying norm was that one ought to keep a critical distance 
to one’s commitments, particularly if these are religious commitments.
The defenders of the cartoons could thus be seen as promoting what has 
been called Enlightenment liberalism, the core principle of which is auton-
omy.17 They favored near absolute freedom of expression and justified this 
principle with reference to something akin to the idea that it promotes aut-
onomy. This camp defended the publication of the cartoons on the basis of 
the conviction that they were a legitimate contribution to vigorous public 
debate, which is a prerequisite for democracy and progress. The critics of 
the cartoons in Denmark saw them as an expression of disrespect for the 
religious feelings of Muslims, indeed as one among many contributions to 
a pervasive anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant public discourse. A Muslim 
organization, characteristically, pitted their right to freedom of religion 
against the right to print the “deeply disrespectful” cartoons.18 This contrast 
seems to fit well into current debates among liberal theorists about the 
relationship between autonomy and respect for diversity. galston claims a 
conflict between the “Enlightenment value” of individual autonomy and 
the “Reformation value” of respect for diversity. According to his view, 
Enlightenment liberals are first and foremost committed to the protection 
and promotion of the ability of individuals to critically reflect on and 
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choose their own way of life, while Reformation liberals find it most 
important to protect diversity, that is, “legitimate differences among indi-
viduals and groups over such matters as the nature of the good life, sources 
of moral authority, reason versus faith, and the like.”19
The critical conclusions of this article are not so much directed at the 
cartoons as such but rather at how their publication was justified and def-
ended. This defense must be understood in its discursive context. My dis-
cussion, therefore, includes an interpretation of the social, cultural, and 
political context of the controversy. If the cartoons had been published in 
an atmosphere that was otherwise characterized by mutual respect and 
atte mpts to try to understand and listen to Danish Muslims, there would 
have been no reason for moral reproach of Jyllands-Posten. But that was 
clearly not the case. The atmosphere of Danish public debate has for some 
years, not least since the election in 2001 (and subsequent reelection) of a 
government that relies on the support of the far-right Danish People’s Party, 
been very hostile toward Muslims, and Jyllands-Posten has been a main 
contributor to this hostility.20 In this context, it is difficult to see the car-
toons only as a legitimate critique of religiously justified terrorism and not 
also and primarily as part of an antagonistic discourse toward Muslims. 
More over, the defense of the cartoons was orchestrated by powerful groups 
and targeted at a weak minority.21 This interpretation of the controversy 
relies on an assessment of empirical questions and is by no means uncontro-
versial. However, as mentioned in the introduction, there is no way of 
applying moral norms to particular cases without engaging in interpretation 
of the empirical context. Moreover, political theory first becomes truly 
relevant when it deals with real political issues, which never can be solved 
by conceptual and normative analysis alone but always involves answering 
empirical questions in addition.
Autonomy as Justification for Freedom of Expression
Among liberal political theorists the most common defense of freedom 
of expression is to invoke the ideal of autonomy.22 Millian arguments from 
truth and arguments from democracy, two other influential justifications for 
freedom of expression, often are, though they might not have to be, based 
ultimately on this ideal, too. It is, however, important to note that freedom 
of expression can be related to and justified on the basis of different concep-
tions of autonomy.23 The core distinction for the argument in this article is 
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between justifications that see freedom of expression as a matter of show-
ing respect for everyone’s autonomy and justifications that see freedom of 
expression as promoting personal autonomy.
While I shall end up arguing that the two types of autonomy are mutu-
ally interdependent, it is valuable first to consider the different justifica-
tions for freedom of expression that they, respectively, can supply and 
especially the different implications that they, when applied separately, 
have for how one ought to exercise the right to express oneself freely. When 
I below describe the two conceptions of autonomy as having different and 
almost opposed implications, I do this, first, in order to show that they are 
indeed different conceptions, and, second, in order to argue that Kantian 
autonomy is the more fundamental one. Even though there are some short-
comings regarding respect for diversity with autonomy as a character ideal, 
we cannot entirely dispense with this conception of autonomy. Rather, the 
danger lies in promoting Millian autonomy without concern for the moral 
constraints on expression required by the Kantian conception of autonomy.
The most influential argument for freedom of expression as constituting 
respect for individual autonomy is T. M. Scanlon’s in “A Theory of Free-
dom of Expression.”24 According to Scanlon, “The powers of the state are 
limited to those that citizens could recognize while still regarding them-
selves as equal, autonomous, rational agents.”25 To regard oneself as auto-
nomous, “a person must see himself as sovereign in deciding what to 
believe and in weighing competing reasons for action.” This idea of auton-
omy rules out justifications for restricting freedom of expression that disre-
spect the individual’s ability to determine by herself what to believe and do. 
Scanlon’s conception of autonomy is “Kantian” (if not Kant’s own) insofar 
as autonomy is something that his theory presupposes that everyone pos-
sesses. In this view, autonomy is not a product of the exercise of freedom 
of expression but the a priori reason that it should be protected.
According to the argument that freedom of expression promotes auton-
omy, autonomy is not presupposed but rather assumed to be fostered by 
free expression.26 This argument relies on the empirical premise that free-
dom of expression actually does promote an autonomous life. It has its 
roots in John Stuart Mill who sees freedom of discussion not merely as 
instrumental to the discovery of truth but perhaps more importantly as a 
prerequisite for the development of individuality.27 If we look at Mill’s 
overall argument for freedom of expression, it includes not only the impor-
tance of truth for society as an aggregate but also the personal autonomy 
that lies in knowing the truth by oneself and acting on it. In this argument, 
autonomy is a character ideal and not an a priori presupposition.
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Respect for Autonomy and the Exercise 
of Freedom of Expression
Is the autonomy defense of freedom of expression a threat to respect for 
diversity and part of a form of Enlightenment liberalism that is incom-
patible with religious forms of life?28 To answer this question we must 
analyze which consequences a commitment to autonomy has for the exer-
cise of free expression. My argument assumes that there is a connection 
between the justification of freedom of expression and how the right ought 
to be exercised. The concern is how the justification of a right translates 
into citizens’ beliefs about the rights’ proper use; in other words, how citi-
zens feel justified and encouraged to act or express themselves in light 
of the justification of the right. The issue is not the legal limits of freedom 
of expression but rather how people regulate themselves in their exercise of 
the right. An unfortunate confusion during the debates over the Muhammad 
cartoons was that some took any criticism of Jyllands-Posten as expressing 
a desire to limit the legal right to freedom of expression rather than merely 
a criticism of its use of the right. But of course we can criticize someone’s 
use of a right without wanting to take it away from her. Not everything we 
are legally permitted to do is morally right to do; legality does not protect 
one from moral blame.29 The question that the Danish cartoons raise is 
whether freedom of expression when justified by the principle of autonomy 
condones or even encourages disrespect for (Muslims’) religious feelings 
in the exercise of freedom of expression.
Promoting Autonomy in the Exercise of 
Freedom of Expression
One way of understanding the principle of autonomy entails not only a 
permission but also an encouragement for people to exercise their right to 
express themselves freely in a way that disrespects Muslims’ religious feel-
ings. If we believe that the reason why we ought to have freedom of expres-
sion is that it has the good consequence of promoting critical self-reflection, 
then we will feel encouraged to use the right to attempt to make others 
critically reflect on their deepest convictions. If one in addition thinks that 
Muslims do not hold their beliefs autonomously, then one will feel encour-
aged to express oneself in ways that one believes will make them critically 
assess their faith. If the targeted Muslims on their side find the expression 
disrespectful (and they are not mistaken),30 then we have a conflict between 
autonomy and respect for diversity.
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The way autonomy figures here is as a character ideal that free expression 
promotes. This view relies on the idea that having an autonomous character 
is an important good the maximization of which justifies freedom of expres-
sion. When freedom of expression is justified with reference to such an idea 
of excellence, people will regard themselves as warranted in and encouraged 
to express themselves in ways that help promote the ideal. This relationship 
between autonomy as a character ideal and encouragement of disrespect for 
religious feelings is not a necessary one but depends on empirical premises. 
It is only when one believes others in fact lack autonomy (in this case reflec-
tive distance to their faith) that one feels encouraged to disrespectfully pro-
voking them. My point is that autonomy as a character ideal under certain 
circumstances encourages disrespect for religious feelings because the prin-
ciple entails no moral constraints that would forbid it.31
The conflict between autonomy as a character ideal and respect for 
Muslims, thus, arises because Muslims are regarded as not having the right 
relationship to their faith. As quoted earlier, some Danish commentators 
argued that Muslims failed to understand that caricatures of religious 
authorities simply are not disrespectful. Muslims were seen as failing to 
live up to a certain ideal of what it means to be a good citizen. Such a citi-
zen has internalized the Enlightenment value of not being governed by her 
religion and understands that caricatures of religious figures are not iden-
tical to ridicule of those who believe in them. From this point of view, the 
cartoons could be seen as a justified provocation exactly because they 
caused offence. The offence taken by some Muslims proved that they 
lacked the required critical distance to their faith. These Muslims were seen 
as having failed to achieve the character ideal that freedom of expression is 
justified with reference to. On this interpretation, the cartoons were meant 
less to foster autonomy among Muslims than to exhibit their difference.
The danger in justifying freedom of expression on the basis of autonomy 
as a character ideal is that it may (though it need not) encourage an arro-
gant use and defense of the right. Some of the comments of Jyllands-
Posten’s editors and those who supported them exhibited a great degree of 
arrogance and was based on the idea that some Muslims lack a critical 
distance to their faith—while the editors saw themselves (and the Danish 
majority) as fully enlightened and as holding a critical distance to their 
commitments. As argued later, the arrogance in question lies in particular 
in an imbalance between what one thinks others can learn from oneself 
and what one thinks one can learn from others. Flemming Rose, the editor 
who commissioned the cartoons, exhibited this one-sidedness when he 
explained why he had done so:
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We have a tradition of satire [in Denmark]. . . . The cartoonists treated Islam 
the same way they treat Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and other reli-
gions. And by treating Muslims in Denmark as equals they made a point: We 
are integrating you into the Danish tradition of satire because you are part of 
our society, not strangers. The cartoons are including, rather than excluding, 
Muslims.32
Rose might want to include Muslims, but it is on his terms; they have to 
listen to and learn from him, while he has not shown an equal interest in 
listening to and learning from Muslims. Thus, the arrogance lies not so 
much in the decision to publish the cartoons as in the rejection of even 
discussing whether it was a good idea to do so; that is, in the rejection of 
engaging in dialogue about the limits and use of the right to freedom of 
expression. My target is not the cartoons as such but rather a particular 
defense of them, a defense which rejects that we have any obligation to 
exercise freedom of expression with concern for the religious feelings of 
others.
So far galston and other “anti-autonomy” liberals are right: a commit-
ment to Enlightenment values and (a specific use of) autonomy can lead to 
disrespect for religious minorities.33 But that is not the whole story; another 
use of autonomy works in the opposite direction and supplies a normative 
foundation for respect for religious feelings.
Respecting Autonomy in the Exercise 
of Freedom of Expression
When autonomy is seen as a character ideal that should be promoted and 
as something some members of society lack, there are no moral constraints 
on how we speak to each other, as long as the means serves the end.34 But 
there is another way of understanding the principle of autonomy that does 
impose moral limits on how we speak to each other. This is the Kantian 
conception according to which autonomy is something everyone is pre-
sumed to possess.35 When freedom of expression is justified with reference 
to this principle of autonomy, people are regarded as capable of determin-
ing for themselves what to believe and do. If the right to freedom of expres-
sion is restricted on the grounds that people are incapable of determining 
by themselves what is right and wrong, true and false, the state fails to 
respect people’s autonomy so conceived.
My suggestion is that if we as a society are committed to freedom of 
expression because of the respect it shows for the citizens’ autonomy, we 
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also ought to show respect for one another’s autonomy in our exercise of 
this right. This respect cannot be legally mandated but is a moral obligation. 
If the state punished us for not speaking respectfully to each other, it would 
disrespect our ability to regulate ourselves. When freedom of expression is 
justified on the basis of respect for the citizens’ autonomy, this entails a 
very wide legal scope for freedom of expression.36 At the same time, it 
imposes greater obligations on citizens to regulate themselves. If citizens 
regard themselves as autonomous and in no need of government restric-
tions on freedom of expression, they must also take upon themselves the 
obligation to show that they are worthy of this freedom. They do so by 
 living up to the ideal that everyone is treated as autonomous, not merely by 
the state but also by each other.
According to Kant, to treat someone as autonomous means treating her 
as a person. A person is something that by its very nature is “an end in 
itself” and “that may not be used merely as a means.”37 A person “is exalted 
above any price” and “possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by 
which he exacts respect for himself by all other rational beings in the 
world.”38 The dignity of a person lies in her ability to reflectively choose or 
endorse her own ends and in doing so in a way that respects everyone’s 
else’s equal ability and freedom to do the same. In other words, a person is 
someone who is able to autonomously choose and revise her own form of 
life and able to do so under the constraints imposed by a moral law to which 
everyone is equally subject and author.39
There are different uses of respect, and we need to clarify which one 
connects to the Kantian conception of autonomy. Stephen Darwall argues 
that we use respect in two different ways, where one, recognition respect, 
consists in correctly recognizing what the other is and the other, appraisal 
respect, consists in the positive appraisal of another.40 I might recognize 
that someone is a person, and I show her respect by regulating my conduct 
based on the recognition of that fact, but it is a very different thing to 
evaluate someone as a good person and praising her character. “The object 
of recognition respect is not excellence or merit; it is dignity or authority. 
Recognition respect concerns, not how something is to be evaluated or 
appraised, but how our relations to it are to be regulated or governed.”41 For 
our discussion, the key difference between these two kinds of respect is that 
one is independent of anything the object does, while the other must be 
deserved. In order to be respected as a person one must merely be a person, 
and the respect consists in that the respecter recognizes that you are a per-
son and acts accordingly. But in order to be positively appraised you have 
to prove that you merit praise. This also means that recognition respect is 
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an either/or (either the other recognizes you as a person or she does not), while 
appraisal respect can be a matter of degree (when we evaluate others, we rank 
order them). Finally, “Recognition respect differs . . . in that it can be man-
dated and not just warranted by its object.”42 I can demand that you respect me 
as a person but not that you evaluate my achievements positively.
The kind of respect that the Kantian conception of autonomy connects 
to is recognition respect. Autonomy as a shared human quality is something 
we respect others as having by recognizing that they are persons. In rela-
tion to our discussion of the exercise of a right to freedom of expression, 
what I find most valuable is the criticism of arrogance involved in the 
Kantian conception. For Kant, respect for human dignity and autonomy 
entails a duty “of not exalting oneself above others.”43 We ought to presume 
that others have reflectively endorsed their ends and that they are good for 
them and therefore treat them as equals the realization of whose ends is as 
important as the realization of our own. At the same time, we ought to treat 
everyone as equally capable of legislating the laws to which everyone is 
subject.44
In Kant, the opposite of arrogance is humility, and it lies in the “con-
sciousness and feeling of the insignificance of one’s moral worth in com-
parison with the moral law.” One shows moral arrogance when one is 
convinced of “the greatness of one’s own moral worth, but only from fail-
ure to compare it with the moral law,” that is, from the failure of according 
everyone else equal standing as autonomous beings.45 As Darwall puts it, 
arrogance is when one believes that one has a moral standing that other 
human beings do not have, by believing either that “one has a claim to 
 others’ recognition respect but that they reciprocally do not have any 
against one” or that “one has a fundamental ‘lawgiving’ standing that others 
simply don’t have.”46 One may ask here if the real work isn’t done by the 
traditional moral vocabulary of arrogance and humility rather than auton-
omy. However, arrogance as used here is defined in terms of the denial of 
others’ autonomy. The Kantian conception of autonomy determines which 
forms of elevation above others are morally wrong, namely, those where 
one reg ards one’s own ends as more important than others’ ends and denies 
others an equal lawgiving standing as one’s own.
We can now return to the issue of whether grounding freedom of expres-
sion in the principle of autonomy encourages disrespect for religious feel-
ings. It might be argued that respecting autonomy entails that speakers as 
autonomous beings should be able to criticize others’ beliefs if they find 
them wrong and listeners as autonomous beings will be able to make up 
their minds about what they hear others say. While I do not deny this, and 
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also see it as the justification for the legal right to freedom of expression, 
respect for autonomy in addition requires that we treat others as equals 
whose (legitimate) ends are as important as our own. Respect for autonomy 
in the latter sense entails that people should be able equally to live according 
to their own deepest beliefs and commitments, and hence others cannot be 
free to disregard these beliefs and commitments in the way they treat them.47 
Thus, respect for autonomy entails a double requirement in terms of how we 
ought to exercise our freedom of expression: on one hand, we must presume 
that speakers and hearers are autonomous and can give and respond to criti-
cism; on the other hand, we must respect each others’ ability to endorse and 
morally constrain our way of life and therefore we cannot disregard others’ 
commitments in the way we speak to them. If people should be able equally 
to live according to their deepest beliefs, it cannot be right that we should 
not take these beliefs seriously in the way we treat others.
How does my claim that one ought not to entirely disregard the beliefs 
of others in the manner one treats them relate to the difference between 
respecting persons and respecting beliefs? Surely, it might be said, one can 
criticize someone’s belief as seriously wrong and show respect for him or 
her as a person by treating him or her as capable of receiving criticism and 
coming to recognize its validity. Particularly, some might find religious 
faith a serious error and one we owe each other to correct. Moreover, this 
error might be seen as one even an autonomous person can arrive at, and 
the certitude by which some people hold it might be one that can be over-
come only through something less respectful than the forceless force of the 
better argument. However, whereas it in some cases is easy to separate 
criticism and even mockery of beliefs from disrespect for the person, in 
others it is not. Some of our beliefs are so closely bound up with who we 
are that we cannot see an attack on them as different from an attack on us. 
In such cases it is crucial that criticism and mockery be very specifically 
directed at the content of the beliefs so it can be received as separable from 
an attack on the person or her group and as distinguishable from a denial of 
their right to live according to their deepest beliefs. This is what is meant 
by not entirely disregarding the beliefs of others—not that one cannot 
criticize others’ beliefs or even in some cases mock them. If the justifica-
tions behind the cartoons and the discourse of which they were part had 
been directed at specific errors of belief, rather than at Muslims as such, my 
evaluation of the case would look different.48
To return to the Kantian conception of autonomy, the humility demanded 
by it shows that it is not a conception of autonomy that encourages disrespect 
of anyone’s beliefs. As Thomas E. Hill argues, modifying Kant, “Basic 
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respect calls all the more for modesty and caution to curb our arrogant bias 
in judging others whom we hardly understand. This requires not only self-
discipline but also, so far as possible, respectful confrontation and communi-
cation with representatives of cultures whose practices we are initially 
inclined to condemn.”49 This modesty in judging others’ beliefs does not 
entail relativism or that one cannot engage in critical dialogue with others 
about their beliefs. Indeed, it is an important aspect of showing respect for 
others’ autonomy that one regards them as capable of responding appropri-
ately to one’s criticisms.50 Arrogance shows itself in the one-sidedness of 
believing others can learn from oneself but not the other way around. To 
treat someone as a person, it is not sufficient that one treats her as reasons 
responsive—or as capable of understanding cartoons, as some publishers of 
the Muhammad cartoons thought51—one must in addition respect her as 
someone both who can contribute with her own ideas and who is equally free 
to influence the form of public debate. For respect to be reciprocal not only the 
content but also the form of public deliberation must be based on the principle 
that everyone should have the right to participate as an equal and also not be 
discouraged from doing so by their fellow citizens. This is required by the 
norm of respecting others as having equal standing as colegislators.
To avoid misunderstanding, the point is not that the cartoons by them-
selves denied Danish Muslims the opportunity to contribute their own 
perspectives to public deliberation. It was the entire discourse among most 
defenders of the cartoons that failed to treat Muslims as equal codelibera-
tors. I have mentioned that Prime Minister Rasmussen spoke of freedom of 
expression as a value that Danes have to stand firm on, indeed a value that 
cannot be discussed. Other prominent participants in the public debate also 
insisted that dialogue with Muslims is fine, “as long as one has clarity 
regarding one’s own values and principles, which are nonnegotiable.”52 It 
was not only the principles in general, not just freedom of expression as 
such, that were spoken of as nonnegotiable; it was the defenders’ own par-
ticular interpretation of the principles and their implications that were 
placed beyond discussion. The principles were treated as something “we” 
(i.e., Enlightened Westerners) already have sufficient insight into—not only 
into which principles are important but also exactly what they mean and 
how to apply them. The arrogance in the defense of the cartoons, then, can 
be found in that those who did not think vilifying the prophet is a valuable 
use of freedom of expression were treated as lacking any insight into how to 
understand freedom of expression. Muslims and sympathetic non-Muslims 
who complained of disrespect were not treated as disagreeing about the inter-
pretation of universal values, or about the limits or exercise of freedom of 
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expression, but as rejecting or not understanding the importance of these val-
ues.53 They were not treated as autonomous in the sense that they could have 
equal insight into which moral principles everyone ought to be subject to.54
Some might find a moral obligation to respect others’ autonomy too vague. 
It might seem unclear what follows from the failure to adhere to this obliga-
tion. Is moral condemnation of Jyllands-Posten all it entails? And is that really 
sufficient or could it be too much? If disrespect is morally wrong, why 
shouldn’t the state step in and prohibit disrespectful deliberation? Note first 
that my argument is directed to those who reject that any moral obligations 
follow from the right to freedom of expression and to those who reject that 
respecting religious feelings can ever be such an obligation. I argue that if one 
insists that there be no or few legal restrictions on expression, then one must 
also accept the obligation to use the right responsibly. This is a response to one 
of the actual questions raised in the Danish public debate that I believe politi-
cal theory can contribute to answering. I am defending the proposition that 
people have a duty to constrain their expression on the basis of the same prin-
ciple of respect for autonomy that is the ground also of freedom of expression, 
and from this normative perspective self-regulation is preferable to legal pro-
hibition. Moreover, legally enforced respect will also tend to freeze a certain 
understanding of respect into law, and this conception of respect will most 
likely not be a universally shared conception but instead “express the mores 
of dominant groups.”55 If we see respect not as a principle with a fully deter-
mined content but as something that must be continually reinterpreted and 
justified by members of all affected cultures in public deliberation, as I think 
we should, then legal constraints aiming to secure respectful public delibera-
tion can be counterproductive. This does not solve “the problem” that the 
moral obligation following from the requirement of treating others as autono-
mous is somewhat vague; it rather opens up for the possibility that this vague-
ness might be an advantage. The argument against arrogance and dogmatism 
means that there are no easy solutions in a case like this, and the argument 
about autonomy implies that the solution is one that citizens must work out 
together while treating each other as equal deliberative authorities capable of 
determining and giving the norms everyone is subject to.
The Interdependence of Kantian Autonomy 
and Autonomy as a Character Ideal
Until now I have detached Kantian autonomy and Millian autonomy in 
order to consider their disparate consequences when applied separately. 
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However, the sharp contrast between autonomy as something that must be 
respected in all human beings and autonomy as a character ideal that must 
be promoted cannot be upheld. To begin with, it might be argued that the 
Millian conception of autonomy is more plausible than what I have called 
the Kantian conception because autonomy actually is an achievement that 
requires us to cast off the tutelage of religious and other dogmas—and that 
unrestrained public discussion is a prime means to this end. It might fur-
thermore be noted that we find an argument along these lines in “What is 
Enlightenment?” in which Kant writes that “it would be a crime against 
human nature” to protect religious authorities and dogmas against criticism 
because this would hinder the progress toward “maturity” (Mündigkeit).56 
I have not argued against the permissibility of criticism of religious dogmas 
but this point nevertheless makes it necessary to stress that the argument is 
not that we should adopt the Kantian conception of autonomy as opposed 
to autonomy as a character ideal. Rather, the argument is that respecting 
autonomy as a shared human quality is the fundamental moral obligation 
and that it ought to constrain attempts to promote autonomy as a character 
ideal. The unrestrained promotion of a specific character ideal will set some 
people’s ends and understanding of the good life above others’ and thus 
treat the latter group as mere means.
Could it not be the case, it might also be asked, that the best way to help 
someone in becoming autonomous actually includes respecting her reli-
gious feelings? Thus there would be a consequentialist argument for res-
pectful public expression, and it would be wrong to claim that justifying 
freedom of expression with reference to the idea that it promotes autonomy 
fails to place (sufficient) moral constraints on how we speak to each other 
and encourages disrespect for religious feelings. It is possible that there are 
good reasons of this sort for criticizing Jyllands-Posten and others who 
show no concern for the religious feelings of minorities. However, it is not 
clear that such instrumental reasons will be sufficiently secure to protect 
minorities against disrespectful expressions. Sometimes respectful dis-
course is not the best way to make people critically reflect on their commit-
ments. In those cases we would need a more reliable moral constraint. My 
argument, then, is that even if certain expressions could be shown to pro-
mote autonomy they are morally wrong if they do not simultaneously 
respect the autonomy of the listener. In other words, the autonomy that 
must be respected is not merely the capacity of the listener for developing 
an autonomous character (that autonomy is respected in the consequential-
ist argument) but the presupposed autonomy that lies in the idea that 
 everyone has reasons of their own to contribute with and therefore ought to 
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be treated as codeliberators and colegislators.57 Moreover, the consequen-
tialist argument relies on the sectarian notion that an autonomous life is 
better than a nonautonomous life, and thus in its very premise it entails 
disrespect for members of cultures that do not share that conception of the 
good.
The main reason that we should not see the two conceptions of auton-
omy as being in opposition, however, is that it is likely that the promotion 
of autonomy as a character ideal is a necessary precondition for people 
showing respect for the autonomy of others. gerald gaus has argued that 
an “ultra-minimal” degree of personal autonomy is required for people being 
morally autonomous.58 People must be capable of self-reflection and role 
taking in order to understand that other people do not share their conception 
of the good and in order to respect them equally. Similarly, it could be 
argued that the humility of which I have spoken requires self-reflection and 
critical distance to one’s deepest commitments. If this is right, my argument 
could be reformulated as a matter of that the defenders of the cartoons 
failed to live up to a certain character ideal; their arrogance would then be 
seen as a failure of self-reflection and role taking.
Where does this leave the argument that justifications for freedom of 
expression that invoke the ideal of promoting autonomy as a character ideal 
can encourage disrespect for religious feelings? Is it not the case that pro-
moting autonomy is required for mutual respect rather than being a threat 
to it? What has been most important for me to argue—mainly as a response 
to “anti-autonomy liberals”—is that there is an autonomy justification for 
freedom of expression that rather than encouraging people to disrespect 
religious feelings actually implies a duty to respect others’ morally permis-
sible ends and their equal standing as colegislators. In this conception, 
autonomy is not a threat to but a ground for respect for diversity. My sug-
gestion is that this conception of autonomy—Kantian autonomy—is the 
fundamental conception of autonomy because it alone requires us to treat 
others as moral equals. However, it is true that it is necessary to promote 
some degree of self-reflection among everyone in a society in order that 
they may accept and act on the requirements of Kantian autonomy and 
mutual respect. Thus, we cannot entirely dispense with autonomy as a char-
acter ideal that must be promoted. Two points are crucial here: First, this 
character ideal is not a good in itself but is justified as instrumental to the 
requirements of equal respect. Critical reflection is not seen as part of 
a mandated conception of the good life. Second, the content of the ideal is 
not that everyone must continually submit their conceptions of the good to 
critical reflection but merely that they are sufficiently self-reflective to 
 at Copenhagen University Library on October 8, 2009 http://ptx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Rostbøll / Danish Cartoon Controversy   639
avoid arrogance and disregard the perspectives of others. In making the 
case for the value of autonomy, we should not succumb to “the temptation 
to make it seem not just necessary but admirable.”59
Thus, while the respective goals of respecting and promoting autonomy 
may indeed clash, they can also at times converge. What should worry us 
is not promotion of autonomy as such but when it happens without respect 
for others. And that is exactly the basis of my criticism of the defense of the 
cartoons in which Danish Muslims were treated perhaps as capable of 
understanding cartoons but not as holding their convictions autonomously 
nor as able to give and subject themselves to common principles. One might 
also interpret the defense of the cartoons as setting up an ideal of free exp-
ression and self-reflection in order not to help Muslims becoming more 
autonomous but to exhibit their inability of becoming so and to show how 
their presence in Danish society impedes the kind of expression autono-
mous people have among themselves—and in this way failing to respect 
them as moral equals.
We should be cautious in assuming that it is only among religious 
minorities in Western democracies that there is a dislike of autonomy, in 
particular of the form of critical self-reflection that can be provoked by 
public discussion and criticism. Empirical studies have shown that there 
also among the majority in Western democracies is a widespread dislike of 
having one’s fundamental beliefs challenged. A common view is this: “We 
have a right to our own opinions whatever they are . . . and therefore, we 
ought ‘to allow a person to believe what they want to believe.’ To try to 
persuade people to change their minds is an invasion of their privacy and 
‘a violation of their rights.’”60 This view expresses a conflict between pub-
lic criticism of fundamental beliefs and individual rights similar to one 
advocated by some Danish Muslims. So if there is a conflict, it is not one 
between a secular majority that values autonomy and a religious minority 
that does not. Rather, it is a conflict that many feel. It is not a conflict 
between cultures but within cultures. For at the same time that many people 
do not like to have their fundamental beliefs challenged, they do tend to see 
themselves as autonomous in the sense that they regard themselves as capa-
ble of determining what is good for themselves and also as able to morally 
constrain themselves. When Danish Muslims claim the right to freedom of 
religion, they presuppose themselves able to form their own independent 
judgment in the matter of religion.
It might be asked how much appeal independent judgment in the matter 
of religion has within Islam. My point is that even if autonomous endorse-
ment of religious beliefs is not important within Islam, Muslims who claim 
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the right to freedom of religion must appeal to independent judgment in 
matters of religion in relation to the surrounding, non-Muslim society. It is 
difficult to see how they can avoid appealing to some idea of that their 
beliefs are somehow theirs when they demand that others respect their right 
to live according to them. This might not require commitment to a strong 
conception of autonomy, but it does require some idea of that Muslims have 
positively embraced their beliefs.61 In addition,
It makes an essential difference whether a democratic state asks a cultural 
group to respect “personal autonomy” [what I call Millian autonomy] 
because of a notion of the good that they might not and need not share, or 
whether they are asked to respect a form of autonomy to which they them-
selves need to take recourse when they demand a justification for a political 
or legal norm and reject ethical “colonization” [i.e., the promotion of one 
conception of the good at the cost of others].62
Thus, the reason why we should see the Kantian conception of autonomy 
as the most fundamental conception is that it is the conception that Muslims 
presuppose when they demand to be respected while not sharing the domi-
nant conception of the good life.
Self-censorship and Its Limits
An important question that may be raised at this point is whether my 
argument restricts expression unduly and leaves too little room for satire 
and caricatures. After all, this was one of the fears of Jyllands-Posten: that 
respect for the sensibilities of Danish Muslims would lead to a degree of 
self-censorship that would harm public debate. First, we should distinguish 
self-censorship based on concern for the religious feelings of others from 
fear-induced self-censorship. Certainly, my argument does not condone that 
anyone is intimidated into silence by threats of violence. Jyllands-Posten 
justified the cartoons partly by the claim that many Danes were afraid to 
offend Muslims; however, they failed to point to any concrete examples of 
threats, and even if they had been able to do so, this would not justify their 
arrogance toward Muslims. Thus, while the limits of expression should not 
be set by threats,63 this does not mean that there cannot be other reasons for 
self-restraint in the exercise of freedom of expression.
Second, one cannot judge whether or not the publication of the cartoons 
showed a morally condemnable disrespect for Danish Muslims without 
considering the discursive context, which I described earlier. In judging 
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whether one’s expressions can be regarded as disrespectful and morally 
wrong, one must consider also the social, cultural, and political position of 
the addressee. If one addresses a group that is already targeted, powerless, 
and feels unable to respond, then one must be much more cautious than if 
one addresses someone whose status as an equal is not in doubt. There is 
no comparison between ridicule of individuals with political authority or 
economic power, and ridicule of the weak and marginalized. The normative 
criterion here is that one ought not to express oneself in ways that under-
mine the addressee’s ability to regard herself as an equal who has equal 
rights to respect and participation in common affairs. I do not think this 
criterion would morally condemn all or too many forms of public satire and 
cartooning. What is special about the Muhammad cartoons is that they are 
(1) part of a pervasive hateful discourse, (2) orchestrated by powerful 
groups, and (3) targeted at a marginalized group (4) who already feel dis-
couraged from participating as equals in society.
Doesn’t this argument entail that Muslims are treated more favorably 
than others? Not necessarily. In a country like Denmark, there might be 
reason to show special concern for Muslims, not because their religious 
feelings are more important than those of other groups, but because without 
special care they are likely to be treated worse than others. Because of the 
homogeneity of Danish culture and the newness of the existence of a 
Muslim minority, there is a special obligation to attempt to understand the 
latter and what it means to treat its members with respect. Thus, the prob-
lem is not only ill will but also epistemic in the sense that even if one wants 
to respect others, this is very difficult if one lacks knowledge and under-
standing of the other’s culture and its standards of respect.64 In this connec-
tion, however, one should recognize the danger of respect turning into 
patronizing condescension toward Muslims. In practice it is an extremely 
difficult balance to both recognize the disadvantaged position of someone 
and to treat him or her as an equal.
Third, the argument that the majority should show special concern 
toward powerless and often misunderstood minorities should not be 
regarded as implying that the latter have a veto regarding what counts as 
wrongful expression. It is not a sufficient reason for concluding that an 
expression is morally wrong that someone finds it insulting. However, a 
complaint of this sort should be taken seriously as a reason for restraint that 
must be considered, if not accepted as it stands. The aim of creating a pub-
lic culture of mutual respect imposes obligations on both speakers and lis-
teners. Everyone ought to recognize that everyone else, each from his or her 
perspective, is capable of contributing insights into the shared enterprise of 
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determining the proper limits of public discourse. While I have emphasized 
the violation of this norm by defenders of the cartoons, it is a norm that also 
listeners—including powerless minorities—can and often do fail to adhere 
to when they claim to have privileged insight into what respectful delibera-
tion requires.
In light of my use of Kant, it should be emphasized that the preceding 
arguments are not and cannot be made a priori or in absolute terms. The 
values of equal power and status are empirical matters and can be justified 
only in relative terms, that is, in relation to the absolute norm of equal respect 
for autonomy. It is part of my overall argument that it is legitimate to intro-
duce such empirical questions into debates about what counts as disrespect. 
Of course, this opens up also for further disagreement, for example, for coun-
terclaims such as that “Muslim power” on a global level is so strong that it 
inhibits necessary criticism of their beliefs also in  Den mark. I find the latter 
claim farfetched, but of course I cannot close that empirical question here.
If the preceding points are valid, one need not be overly concerned that the 
type of respectful exercise of freedom of expression that I recommend has too 
high costs in terms of learning or would require that one abandons the search 
for truth. Robert Post argues that Jyllands-Posten’s cartoons should be 
allowed, if “public policy is to be directed by intelligently informed public 
opinion.”65 If my analysis is right, it is not the demand for respect for religious 
feelings that inhibits the formation of an intelligent public opinion in Denmark 
but rather the arrogance of those who refuse to discuss or listen to the com-
plaints. This does not mean that there cannot be conflicts between the aims of 
respecting religious feelings and promoting intelligent public opinion. But the 
cartoon case shows that standing firm on the principle of freedom of expres-
sion and rejecting the imperative of showing respect for a marginalized minor-
ity is a form arrogance, which if anything inhibits mutual learning.
Conclusion
The rejection of the principle of autonomy in liberal theory has gone too 
far. It ignores the different implications with regard to respect for diversity 
of different conceptions of autonomy. This article has attempted to show 
this in relation to the justification and exercise of freedom of expression. 
I have distinguished two conceptions of autonomy and would like in con-
clusion to outline three models of relating the two conceptions. In the first 
model, freedom of expression is justified with reference to the idea that it 
promotes the development of autonomous characters without regarding it is 
as a central aim to provoke self-reflection among the targeted group in its 
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exercise. This might sound paradoxical, but it is nevertheless a possible 
interpretation of the Danish case: the aim of the cartoons might not have 
been to promote autonomy among Muslims but to exhibit their difference in 
terms of a character ideal. The connection to freedom of expression is the 
belief that Muslims—because of their unreflective religious sensitivity—
hinder the type of public discourse that autonomous people have among 
themselves. Here there is no presumption that the targets of “scorn, mock-
ery, and ridicule” are or should be able to develop autonomy.
The second model also posits the promotion of autonomy as a character 
ideal as the justification for freedom of expression, but its most scornful 
exercise is now regarded as aiming at provoking self-reflection among 
those addressed with scorn. With regard to the cartoon controversy, this 
model implies that Muslims were the addressees and that they were 
respected as capable of developing autonomy. However, the latter presump-
tion was not regarded as providing a constraint on expression, and there 
was no commitment to the idea that no one can entirely forfeit respect as 
an autonomous human being. The discourse defending the cartoons oscil-
lates between these two first models.
In the third model, which is the one I defend, Kantian autonomy is fun-
damental, and the promotion of a character ideal is seen as having only 
instrumental value. If I am right about the relationship between the justifi-
cation and the exercise of a right, this justification should both demand and 
encourage people to express themselves in ways that show respect for 
 others as autonomous beings. While people know that this is the fundamen-
tal moral requirement in the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, 
they should know also that promoting self-reflection is a prerequisite for 
mutual respect, and thus in addition feel encouraged to express themselves 
in ways that lead to this end. Thus, the promotion of autonomy through 
expression is not wrong but it should be constrained by the more fundamen-
tal requirement that we when we engage with others in the public sphere 
presume that they are autonomous agents who are not only able to respond 
appropriately to our expressions but who can also contribute with their 
own, and who must be addressed in ways that do not discourage them from 
doing so nor disregard their equal ability to live according to their deepest 
beliefs while respecting others’ equal right to do the same.
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